RICHARD HAYNER, SOCIAL WORKER, WAKE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES
Defendant Richard Hayner, Social Worker Supervisor being hereby named in both his individual and official capacities, is an individual and a resident of this jurisdictional district, is a county employee and was at all times material, pertinent and relevant hereto, employed by Wake County Human Services in Wake County, North Carolina. Current mailing address is; c/o Wake County Human Services, 220 Swinburne Street, Raleigh, NC 27610. The Defendant was in fact, acting under the authority or color of state law at the time these claims occurred in that while in his official capacity as a social worker supervisor for WCHS his execution of Wake County Human Services’ “customs” and/or “policies” were the moving force behind his unconstitutional acts, and that personally, his individual unconstitutional acts violated the clearly established constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs of which a reasonable official would have known, Davis v. Scherer (1984). In addition, acting personally and individually he did act under the authority or color of state law when he acted in concert with other local officials, including but not limited to, other WCHS social workers, their supervisors, county attorneys and others, causing harm to the Plaintiffs in effecting the deprivation of rights, Dennis v. Sparks (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 places liability on any person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another to a constitutional deprivation. This language suggests that there are two ways a defendant may be liable for a constitutional deprivation under § 1983: (1) direct, personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation on the part of the defendant, or (2) actions or omissions that are not constitutional violations in themselves, but foreseeable leads to a constitutional violation. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit offered a most cogent discussion of this issue in Arnold v. International Bus. Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1981): A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made…. Moreover, personal participation is not the only predicate for section 1983 liability. Anyone who “causes” any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id. at 1355 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
A supervisor is liable under § 1983 if he “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do,” causing constitutional injury, Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F. 2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). A supervisor is liable for “his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation …; for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others,” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F. 3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997). A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity if “he set in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F. 2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). “Supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in constitutional injuries they inflict.” Slakan v. Porter, 737 F. 2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984). “The nature of the causation required in cases of this kind is explained in Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F. 2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978). There, it was held that for purposes of § 1983 liability the requisite causal chain can occur through the ‘setting in motion of a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.
COUNT I; VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT – Searches and Seizures as to the minor children, and THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – Due Process Clause as to the parents, as Social Worker Supervisor to Jill Green and Saundra Judd
Richard Hayner was present at the unlawful hearing held by Judge Christian on May 3, 2010. He did not testify. However there was reference to him during Jill Green’s perjured testimony which also included plenty of hearsay. i proceeded with a line of questioning to confirm that Jill Green and Her supervisor Richard Hayner in fact, did sign the letter dated October 29, 2010 closing the case with a finding of “no abuse in the home.” Jill’s response in confirming this fact was as follows; “I closed my case. I know my supervisor and another coworker came out because I was out on leave.” And then she stated; “right, and we did close the case at that time,” to which the Judge then asked, who was her supervisor and was he in the courtroom. Jill Green confirmed that Richard Hayner was in the courtroom. The judge then asked Jill Green; “Mr. Hayner shared his concerns, that there may be actual abuse?” (talk about hearsay and leading a witness???) to which I objected and asked that Mr. Hayner be called as a witness to respond for himself. Judge Christian emphatically “Over Ruled” my objection. Jill Green responded “he felt that Mr. Reale was very set in his ways and very strict, and I’m not sure.” Overall Richard Hayner is clearly responsible for his own actions and for the actions of his subordinates in every way especially when acting under the authority or color of law. Richard Hayner was the Supervisor for Jill Green and Saundra Judd.